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I. INTRODUCTION
In May 2015, the state of New York seized Jerry Campbell’s four-story brick
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home in Brooklyn, New York. 1 The home belonged to Mr. Campbell’s family for
sixty years starting with his grandfather. 2 After his grandfather’s passing, Mr.
Campbell came into possession of the home and he and his wife hoped to raise
their son in it.3 Instead, Campbell’s decade-long battle with the state and Forest
City Ratner (FCR), a private development company, culminated in the state
taking the home and razing it to the ground. 4
The state coveted Mr. Campbell’s home for constructing the Atlantic Yard
project, a private development plan that built the Barclays Center: an arena for
the NBA’s Brooklyn Nets and NHL’s New York Islanders.5 After negotiations
over compensation between Mr. Campbell and the state stalled, the state
responded by taking the home through eminent domain.6
Eminent domain allows federal, state, and local governments to take private
property for public use as long as the government pays the landowner “just
compensation.”7 Countless cities have employed eminent domain to build sports
and entertainment venues;8 including, but not limited to, Brooklyn (Barclays
Center),9 Sacramento (The Golden 1 Center), 10 Atlanta (SunTrust Park)11, Dallas
(Globe Life Park)12, Los Angeles (Dodgers Stadium)13, and Washington D.C.
(Nationals Park).14
This Comment maintains that using fair market value to meet the “just
1. Michael O’Keefe, No Place Like Home: Atlantic Yards Project has Jerry Campbell Fighting for his
Place in Brooklyn, N.Y. D AILY NEWS (Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/i-team/atlanticyards-project-brooklyn-family-fighting-home-article-1.2598611 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. U.S. CONST. amend V; U.S. Const. amend XIV.
8. Ryan Lillis, Sacramento Kings will Pay $12 Million for Former Macy’s Property under Court
Settlement, SACRAMENTO BEE (Feb. 10, 2015), https://www.sacbee.com/news/local/news-columns-blogs/citybeat/article9711272.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Ilya Somin, The Bush Family
and Eminent Domain, WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2016/02/08/the-bush-family-and-eminent-domain/?utm_term=.7829afddedb5 (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review); Evann Gastaldo, 31 Georgia Residents to Have Homes Demolished for
Ballpark, NEWSER (Nov. 18, 2016), http://www.newser.com/story/234230/31-georgia-residents-to-have-homesdemolished-for-ballpark.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); David Nakamura, D.C.
Seizes 16 Owners’ Property for Stadium, WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/10/25/AR2005102501354_pf.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review); O’Keefe, supra note 1; Elijah Chiland, The Troubled Past of Dodge Stadium and Chavez Ravine, L.A.
CURBED (Apr. 3, 2016), https://la.curbed.com/2016/4/3/11358092/dodger-stadium-history-chavez-ravine (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
9. O’Keefe, supra note 1.
10. Lillis, supra note 8.
11. Gastaldo, supra note 8.
12. Somin, supra note 8.
13. Chiland, supra note 8.
14. Nakamura, supra note 8.
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compensation” requirement of the Fifth Amendment drastically
undercompensates property owners. 15 Paying “just compensation” purports to
make former property owners “whole” and the Supreme Court views fair market
value as achieving this goal. 16 Fair market value is what a willing buyer would
pay for the property at the time of the taking.17 However, fair market value does
not compensate for sentimental value of the home, gains generated by the new
development, and other miscellaneous costs such as attorney’s fees, relocation
costs, and home replacement costs if the price exceeds the fair market value. 18
Therefore, fair market value severely undercompensates property owners and
ultimately fails to make property owners “whole.” 19
Additionally, this Comment argues that, as a matter of public policy, fair
market value is not enough to satisfy the “just compensation” element of the
Fifth Amendment. 20 Finally, this Comment proposes that state and local
governments employing eminent domain to build stadiums should adequately
compensate property owners by paying the condemned property’s fair market
value and a share of the stadium’s profits to the property owners. 21
Part II of this Comment examines the seminal case of Kelo v. City of New
London.22 Part III discusses the economic impact stadiums effectuate on cities
and provides examples of governments employing eminent domain for sports
stadiums, unfettered by the potentially harmful economic consequences of
stadium construction. 23 Part IV explores proposed solutions by scholars at
rectifying fair market value’s inadequacies. 24 Part V presents this Comment’s
proposal – that cities should pay compensation beyond fair market value to
owners whose property has been taken through eminent domain to construct
stadiums.25 In particular, this Comment advocates that property owners receive a
share of the stadium’s profits and their property’s fair market value. 26
II. KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON AND “JUST COMPENSATION”
Although much of the conversation surrounding eminent domain concerns
the “public use” requirement, the “just compensation” component equally

15. U.S. CONST. amend V.
16. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar
Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 81 (1913).
17. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 511.
18. JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW 690–91 (4th ed. 2017).
19. Infra Parts V–VI.
20. U.S. CONST. amend V.
21. Infra Part VI.
22. Infra Part II.
23. Infra Part III.
24. Infra Part V.
25. Infra Part VI.
26. Infra Part VI.
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requires a closer look. 27 Section A introduces and discusses the case of Kelo v.
City of New London.28 Section B examines the “just compensation” requirement
of eminent domain.29 Section C examines the items not included in “just
compensation.”30
A. Kelo v. City of New London
The decision in Kelo v. City of New London not only sparked national public
outrage and protests, but greatly broadened the definition of “public use” and
furthered a discussion on “just compensation.” 31 In 2000, the city of New
London, Connecticut, an economically depressed city, approved a development
plan the city projected would revitalize the city by creating more than 1,000 jobs,
increase tax revenue, and construct new homes, restaurants, hotels, and other
recreational opportunities. 32 Pfizer Inc., a pharmaceutical company, announced it
would build a new research facility in the city, something that local planners
hoped would jump-start the city’s revival.33 The city received funds from the
State but needed the land for the project.34 The city’s development agency bought
properties from willing sellers and used eminent domain to acquire the remaining
properties from unwilling owners. 35 These unwilling owners sued the city and
argued that taking their properties violated the “public use” requirement of the
Fifth Amendment.36 The owners maintained that their properties were not
“blighted or otherwise in poor condition; rather, they were condemned only
because they happen to be located in the development area.”37
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the city. 38 Justice Stevens wrote that the
redevelopment plan “unquestionably serves as a public purpose” and the taking
satisfied the public use requirement.39 Moreover, since economic development
has been “a traditional and long accepted function of government,” taking private
property to better an economically depressed area is permissible. 40 Justice
Stevens further wrote that this decision does not prevent States from

27. See Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (discussing “public use”).
28. Infra, Section II.C.
29. Infra, Section II.D.
30. Infra, Section II.E.
31. J OHN G. SPRANKLING & RAYMOND R. COLETTA, PROPERTY A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 919–921
(3rd ed. 2015).
32. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472–75 (2005); SPRANKLING, supra note 18, at 688.
33. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473.
34. Id. at 472–73.
35. Id. at 472.
36. Id. at 475.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 490.
39. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484; SPRANKLING, supra note 18, at 688.
40. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484.
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implementing restrictions on their own eminent domain laws.41 Justice O’Connor
disagreed and wrote in her dissent that the Court’s decision “wash[es] out any
distinction between private and public use of property – and thereby effectively
to delete the words ‘for public use’ from the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.”42
Outrage over Kelo further intensified following Pfizer’s decision to not to
build the facility in New London.43 As a result, Kelo prompted most states to pass
legislation that imposed greater restraints on eminent domain. 44 Although the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Kelo focused primarily on the “public use” test, the
transcript of the oral arguments in Kelo raised questions concerning the
determination of “just compensation.” 45
B. “Just Compensation” and the Fair Market Value Dilemma
The Fifth Amendment mandates the government to pay “just compensation”
when it takes private property.46 The Supreme Court defined “just compensation”
as the fair market value of the property. 47 Fair market value is the amount a
willing buyer would pay to a willing seller.48The purpose of "just compensation"
is to make the property owner "whole" by putting them in as good a monetary
position as before the government utilized eminent domain. 49
The Supreme Court in United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land noted the
limitations of paying just fair market value of the property. 50 As Justice Marshall
wrote, “the Court has acknowledged that such an award does not necessarily
compensate for all values an owner may derive from his property . . . . [t]hus, we
have held that fair market value does not include the special value of property to
the owner arising from its adaptability to his particular use.”51 Fair market value
does not compensate for the sentimental value of the home, gains the new
development generates, and other miscellaneous costs such as attorney’s fees,
relocation costs, and home replacement costs if the price exceeds the fair market

41. Id. at 489.
42. Id. at 494.
43. SPRANKLING, supra note 18, at 688–89.
44. Id.
45. Transcript of Oral Argument at 48–51, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04–
108) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Infra Part II, Section C; Part V.
46. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
47. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Company, 229 U.S. 53, 81 (1913) (“the owner must
be compensated for what is taken from him; but that is done when he is paid its fair market value for all
available uses and purposes.”)
48. SPRANKLING, supra note 18, at 690.
49. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979); SPRANKLING, supra note 18, at
690; Katrina Miriam Wyman, The Measure of Just Compensation, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 239, 252 (2007).
50. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 511.
51. Id.
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value. 52
In addition, the Supreme Court in United States v. 50 Acres of Land further
acknowledged situations where fair market value is an inadequate payment to
property owners.53 Concurring in the majorities’ opinion, Justice O’Connor
wrote:
[W]hen a local governmental entity can prove that the market value of its
property deviates significantly from the make-whole remedy intended by the Just
Compensation Clause and that a substitute facility must be acquired to continue
to provide an essential service, limiting compensation to fair market value in my
view would be manifestly unjust.54
Even though the purpose of fair market value is to “put the owner of
condemned property in as good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not
been taken,”55 fair market value does not always achieve this goal. 56 The oral
arguments in Kelo v. City of New London highlighted the flaws of the fair market
value standard.57 During the oral arguments in Kelo, Justice Breyer posed a
hypothetical to New London’s counsel where a person, who bought a home for
$50,000 and has lived in it his entire life, is suddenly forced to evict but is given
$500,000 for the home. 58 That person has a $450,000 profit but he must pay 30%
of this profit in taxes and he must find somewhere to live. 59 Justice Breyer
continued:
[W]ell, I mean, what’s he supposed to do? He now has probably $350,000 to
pay for a house. He gets half a house because that’s all he is going to do, all he is
going to get for that money after he paid the taxes…is there some way of
assuring that the just compensation actually puts the person in the position he
would be in if he didn’t sell his house? Or is he inevitably worse off?60
New London’s counsel admitted that although there were relocation loans
available to those forced to leave, it did not make the former owners “whole.” 61
Although “just compensation” was not an issue in Kelo v. City of New London,
the Supreme Court raised it anyways, fueling the debate of how much
compensation is considered “just.”62 Kelo, United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land,
and United States v. 50 Acres of Land illustrate the Supreme Court’s consensus
that fair market value undercompensates property owners.63

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
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Wyman, supra note 49, at 254–55; SPRANKLING, supra note 18, at 691.
United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 37 (1984).
Id.
564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 510 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Infra Part V.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 45, at 48–51.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 45, at 48.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 45, at 48.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 45, at 48.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 45, at 49.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 45, at 49.
See United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 37 (1984); See also United States v. 564.54
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C. Items Not Subject to Compensation
Subjective premiums on property the government seizes through eminent
domain do not use the fair market value standard for compensation. 64
“Subjective” premiums imply not only sentimental value but out-of-pocket costs
of moving (relocation expenses), search of shops and services for new locations,
and site improvements that assist the owner’s uses but do not increase the fair
market value.65 Moreover, the cost of replacing the condemned property is not
compensated. 66 Likewise, renters are at risk of harm because leased property
taken through eminent domain terminates the lease, “rendering the remaining
portion of the tenant’s lease valueless.”67 Further, property owners cannot share
in the benefits the new economic development generates “because fair market
value is calculated before those benefits accrue.”68
The government wipes out sentimental value, personal attachments to one’s
home, place of business, or community in favor of fair market value. 69
Additionally, subjective premiums are personal and cannot be transferred. 70
Subjective premiums die with the person.71
To make matters worse, property owners are not compensated for surpluses
or gains generated that a market transfer might generate. 72 Sometimes, the
property has a higher value when it is transferred to a private party than the
government.73 However, if faced with eminent domain, the original property
owner only receives fair market value for the property. 74 The government retains
the surplus.75 In addition, property owners are also not compensated for the
autonomy to sell when they desire. 76 A property owner may wish to sell later for

Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979);
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 45, at 48.
64. Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 956957956, 963
(2004).).).
65. Id.
66. Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L. REV. 101,
106 (2006).).).
67. Id. at 107.
68. Id. at 110.
69. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981) (showing that
Poletown’s residents lost community premium stemming from the neighborhood after Detroit seized one
thousand residential properties to build a new General Motors facility); Abraham Bell and Gideon
Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation Private, 59 STAN. L. REV. 871, 886–87 (2007); Fennell, supra note 64, at
963.
70. Fennell, supra note 64, at 964.
71. Id.
72. Fennell, supra note 64, at 965; Garnett, supra note 66, at 107.
73. Fennell, supra note 64, at 966.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 967.
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a higher or lower price, but loses this choice through eminent domain. 77
Property owners may also suffer from “dignitary harms,” triggered by the
loss of security.78 Property owners may feel “unsettled and vulnerable when they
learn that the government plans to take their property.”79 In line with the loss of
autonomy, property owners will feel they cannot exclude others from their
property. 80 Unsurprisingly, the government does not compensate for “dignitary
harms.”81
Furthermore, under-compensation issues often arise as a result of the
government’s superior bargaining power in negotiations with property owners. 82
Government abuse of bargaining power often leads to various negative results,
leaving property owners unfairly disadvantaged. 83
Although the government does not compensate for subjective value and
community premiums, scholars have suggested that a combination of subjective
value, community premiums, and political influence may deter governments
from taking private property and entirely avoiding under-compensation. 84
III. EMINENT DOMAIN AND STADIUM CONSTRUCTIONS
Governments have used eminent domain to construct stadiums since 1958
and it continues to be a popular option for governments to lure sports franchises,
despite overwhelming evidence that stadiums are bad investments. 85 Initially,
stadiums did not receive widespread government support.86Teams used private
funds to subsidize historically well-known stadiums such as Yankee Stadium,
Fenway Park, and Wrigley Field. 87 After World War II, professional sports
became a big business and sparked the use of eminent domain to build
stadiums.88 Dodgers Stadium became “a watershed moment” for using eminent

77. Id.
78. Garnett, supra note 66, at 109.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 69, at 887.
83. Id. (noting “For years, the Minnesota Department of Transportation has taken private land for road
projects and offered the owners substantially less than the land was worth”).
84. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981) (showing a
religious leader leading the protests against eminent domain and having partial success; General Motors offered
to spend millions to move the pastor’s church); Garnett, supra note 66, at 119.
85. See Chiland, supra note 8 (explaining the use of eminent domain to build the Los Angeles Dodgers
stadium); Alex Garcia, Sports Stadiums are Bad Public Investments. So Why are Cities Still Paying for Them?,
REASON, (Mar. 17, 2015), https://reason.com/reasontv/2015/03/17/sports-stadiums-are-bad-public-investmen
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
86. Philip Weinberg, Eminent Domain for Private Sports Stadiums: Fair Ball or Foul?, 35 ENVTL. L.
311, 314 (2005) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
87. Id.
88. Id.

86

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 51
domain to build stadiums.89
In 1958, the Brooklyn Dodgers moved to Los Angeles after Brooklyn refused
to finance a stadium. 90 Los Angeles picked Chavez Ravine as the location to
build a new stadium. 91 Chavez Ravine had a history as the home to a MexicanAmerican community made up of hundreds of families.92 Years earlier in 1950,
the city had originally picked Chavez Ravine for a new housing development
project called Elysian Park Heights. 93 The city used its eminent domain power to
buy out residents of Chavez Ravine, promising the citizens first choice to the new
housing project.94 The housing project never came into fruition, leaving the
ravine mostly abandoned. 95 In 1957, only 20 families remained on the property
and in 1958, city voters approved giving the land to the Dodgers. 96 Police
forcibly evicted the remaining residents. 97
Since the construction of Dodgers’ Stadium, cities began searching for
teams.98 Two cases, City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders and Cascott LLC v. City
of Arlington illustrate how courts in different jurisdictions consistently approve
government’s use of eminent domain for sports franchises and stadiums. 99
Section A presents Oakland, California’s pursuit in keeping the Raiders in
Oakland and Section B discusses Arlington, Texas’ attempt at securing land for
the Cowboys stadium. 100 Section C illustrates how stadiums are not good
investments.101
A. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders
Since 1966, the Raiders football team played at the Oakland-Alameda
County Coliseum in Oakland, California. 102 Following three renewals of the
three-year lease on the stadium, the Raiders decided to end the lease. 103 In 1980,
the Raiders announced their intentions to move to Los Angeles. 104 The City of
Oakland responded and commenced an eminent domain action against the
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Chiland, supra note 8.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Chiland, supra note 8.
97. Id.
98. Weinberg, supra note 86, at 315.
99. Cascott, L.L.C. v. City of Arlington, 278 S.W.3d 525 (Tex. App. 2009); City of Oakland v. Oakland
Raiders, 32 Cal.3d 60 (1982).
100. Infra Sections III.A–B.
101. Infra Section III.C.
102. Raiders, 32 Cal.3d at 63.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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team. 105
The California Supreme Court ruled in favor of the City of Oakland. 106 The
Court approved the City’s use of eminent domain referencing Candlestick Park in
San Francisco, California and Anaheim Stadium in Anaheim, California. 107 As
Justice Richardson wrote, “both [referring to Candlestick Park and Anaheim
Stadium] owned and operated by municipalities, further suggest the acceptance
of the general principles that providing access to recreation to its residents in the
form of spectator sports is an appropriate function of city government.” 108
Justice Richardson also mentioned and agreed with courts in New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and Ohio that eminent domain is a viable option to erect
stadiums.109 Justice Richardson noted, “a sports stadium is for the recreation of
the public and is hence for a public purpose; for public projects are not confined
to providing only the bare bones of municipal life, such as police protection,
streets, sewers, light, and water; they may provide gardens, parks, monuments,
fountains, libraries, [and] museums …. ” 110 Therefore, the California Supreme
Court held that if a city proves a sports franchise to be a valid public use, the city
may use eminent domain on property “necessary to accomplish that use.”111
B. Cascott LLC v. City of Arlington
In 2004, the Dallas Cowboys negotiated a “Master Agreement” with the City
of Arlington, Texas to build a new stadium complex in Arlington. 112 The “Master
Agreement” included a lease that outlined the terms of the Cowboy’s use of the
stadium. 113 The City and the Cowboys identified the location for the project and
the City Council passed a resolution allowing City representatives to purchase
property within this location.114 However, some property owners could not reach
an agreement with the City. 115 Consequently, the City initiated condemnation
proceedings against those property owners. 116
The property owners argued that the stadium was not for a public purpose
because the Cowboys’ lease granted them “exclusive use and rights to manage
and control the condemned property for … at least thirty (30) years.”117 The court

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
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Id.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 71.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Martin v. Philadelphia, 420 Pa. 14, 215 (1966)).
Id. at 72.
Cascott, L.L.C. v. City of Arlington, 278 S.W.3d 525, 525 (Tex. App. 2009).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 529.
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conceded that the Cowboys would “reap substantial benefits from the project,
including the Lease,” but a private benefactor does not solely change the purpose
of taking the property. 118 The court held in favor of the City because the
Cowboys’ lease the public purpose of the stadium project.119
C. Impact of Stadiums on Local Economies
The most prominent argument proponents use to validate building a new
stadium for professional sports teams is that the stadium will boost the local
economy. 120 Proponents often claim that stadiums will produce economic
revenue and jobs for the city.121 However, these “promises are rarely realized.” 122
Stadiums are bad public investments because most jobs stadiums create only
produce “temporary, low-paying, or out-of-state contracting jobs–none of which
contribute greatly to the local economy.”123 In addition, stadium costs often
exceed estimated amounts as maintenance costs, municipal services, and capital
improvements cause the city’s total investment to skyrocket. 124
Modern stadiums cost over $1 billion to construct.125 For example, Los
Angeles Stadium, the new home of the Los Angeles Rams and Chargers football
teams, will cost $2.66 billion to build. 126 The Mercedes Benz Stadium in Atlanta,
Georgia cost $1.6 billion and the Las Vegas Raiders Stadium will cost an
estimated $2.4 billion to construct.127 Out of the ten most expensive stadiums
built, seven are for NFL franchises. 128 Football stadiums tend to provide the least
economic benefit, as they are used so infrequently. 129 Football stadiums only host
two preseason games, eight regular season games, and if they are fortunate, a few
playoff games. 130 Thus, stadiums must be constructed for multi-purpose use to
host other events like concerts, college football games, soccer games, and hockey

118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Clifton B. Parker, Sports Stadiums Do Not Generate Significant Local Economic Growth, Stanford
Expert Says, STAN. NEWS (July 30, 2015), https://news.stanford.edu/2015/07/30/stadium-economics-noll073015/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
121. Garcia, supra note 85.
122. Id.
123. Aaron Gordon, America has a Stadium Problem, PACIFIC STANDARD (July 17, 2013),
https://psmag.com/economics/america-has-a-stadium-problem-62665 (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
124. Id.
125. SeatGeek, The 10 Most Expensive Stadiums in Sports, SEATGEEK.COM (Aug. 7, 2017),
https://seatgeek.com/tba/sports/the-top-ten-most-expensive-sports-stadiums/ (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Parker, supra note 120.
130. Id.
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games to generate economic benefit. 131
Although stadiums receive private and public funding, the public bears most
of the costs.132 Taxpayer money primarily funds stadium construction. Moreover,
the public provides the location and, most significantly, absorbs any debts from
financing the stadium. 133 Oakland, California and St. Louis, Missouri are still
making substantial annual payments on the debts incurred by the “now-obsolete
stadiums that were built to lure the Oakland Raiders and St. Louis Rams away
from Los Angeles in the 1990s.”134 The Cities’ residents are still paying for a
stadium that no team plays in. 135
City governments continue using eminent domain to obtain land for stadium
constructions, betting on economic prosperity. 136 The following are two
contrasting effects stadium construction can have over Cities. 137 Part 1 discusses
the Barclays Center and the negative effects a City typically encounters, whereas
Part 2 examines a rare case in the Golden 1 Center which has tentatively
produced economic growth. 138
1. The Barclays Center
The Barclays Center is a key example of the problems stadium construction
can have on a community. 139 Organizers promised affordable housing, but it has
not yet materialized.140 Current constructions of affordable housing face
structural and engineering problems. 141 While the businesses surrounding the
Barclays Center profited due to their existence prior to the arena’s construction—
mainly because of the rising popularity of the area—the arena itself lost $9
131. Id.
132. Garrett Johnson, The Economic Impact of New Stadiums and Arenas on Cities, 10 U. DENV. SPORTS
& ENT. L.J. 1, 22 (2011) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
133. Clifton B. Parker, Sports Stadiums Do Not Generate Significant Local Economic Growth, Stanford
Expert Says, STAN. NEWS (July 30, 2015), https://news.stanford.edu/2015/07/30/stadium-economics-noll073015/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
134. Clifton B. Parker, Sports Stadiums Do Not Generate Significant Local Economic Growth, Stanford
Expert Says, STAN. NEWS (July 30, 2015), https://news.stanford.edu/2015/07/30/stadium-economics-noll073015/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
135. Clifton B. Parker, Sports Stadiums Do Not Generate Significant Local Economic Growth, Stanford
Expert Says, STAN. NEWS (July 30, 2015), https://news.stanford.edu/2015/07/30/stadium-economics-noll073015/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
136. Gordon, supra note 123.
137. Infra Sections III.C.1–2.
138. Anthony L. Fisher, Brooklyn’s Barclays Center is an Eminent Domain-Created Failure, REASON
(Jan. 12, 2016), https://reason.com/blog/2016/01/12/barclays-center-eminent-domain-fail (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review); Keith Schneider, Welcome to the Neighborhood: America’s Sports
Stadiums
Are
Moving
Downtown,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
19,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/19/business/sports-arena-development.html (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review).
139. Fisher, supra note 138.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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million in its third year of operation. 142 Additionally, operating expenses of the
Barclays Center remain high, but the arena’s net operation income fell behind
expectations.143
2. The Golden 1 Center
The Golden 1 Center in Sacramento, California produced the opposite effect
of the Barclays Center.144 The Golden 1 Center replaced a nearly empty shopping
mall in downtown Sacramento.145 The stadium’s construction spurred a 38%
increase in jobs in the downtown region, and twenty-seven stores opened in
2017, with twenty-three more scheduled to open in 2018.146 Additionally, the vast
amount of construction caused the city to “hire two dozen new employees to
process applications and building permits.”147
As the Golden 1 Center illustrates, employing eminent domain to build a
sports stadium may have positive effects on the local economy. 148 However, in
most cases, stadiums do not produce this anticipated economic growth. 149 Yet,
local government officials continue to recklessly push for eminent domain to
build stadiums. 150 One way to curtail government’s use of eminent domain to
build stadiums is the “just compensation” element.151 To counter the rash
decision-making of government, property owners who suffer from an eminent
domain taking should receive higher compensation. 152
IV. PROPOSED REFORMS TO “JUST COMPENSATION”
Scholars generally agree that fair market value is “practically a euphemism,
in the sense that it generally does not fairly compensate landowners.”153 As a
result, many scholars proposed alternative measures to calculate “just
compensation,” eschewing fair market value. 154 One proposal involves

142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Schneider, supra note 138.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Garcia, supra note 85.
150. See Dennis Lynch, The Fate of the Forum in Inglewood has James Dolan Crying Foul in Court,
THE REAL DEAL (Mar. 6, 2018), https://therealdeal.com/la/2018/03/06/fate-of-the-forum-in-inglewood-hasjames-dolan-crying-foul/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (revealing the Los Angeles
Clipper’s proposed plans for an stadium in Inglewood, CA require eminent domain to be built).
151. Infra Part V.
152. Infra Part V.
153. Amnon Lehavi & Amir N. Licht, Eminent Domain Inc., 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1704, 1718 (2007);
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 56 (6th ed. 2003).
154. Infra Sections V.A, B, C.
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incorporating the “publicly-expressed expected benefits of the project” into
compensation by modifying “just compensation” to reflect the current value by
including economic development of the condemned land to the amount of
compensation.155 Another proposal recommends awarding 150% of the fair
market value to former property owners when there are “suspect” conditions in
the eminent domain process, i.e., high subjective value. 156
Section A discusses Professor Katrina Wyman’s objective approach to
takings compensation.157 Section B explores Professors Amnon Lehavi and Amir
Licht’s special-purpose development corporation approach. 158 Section C analyzes
Professors Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky’s self-assessment
proposition.159
A. Objective Measure to Takings Compensation
Professor Wyman’s approach to takings compensation employs an objective
metric for determining “just compensation.” 160 Under an objective metric, people
are made “whole” by receiving items that are broadly accepted by society as
items that make people “whole.” 161 Professor Wyman acknowledged that
applying an objective measure to takings compensation is difficult because “there
are many different conceptions of what is important in life.” 162 However, an
objective measure to takings compensation fits the Supreme Court’s desire to put
“the owner of condemned property in as good a position pecuniarily as if his
property had not been taken,” better than fair market value can. 163 Furthermore,
an objective approach avoids the problems that a subjective measure
encounters.164 Professor Wyman’s proposal relies on two possible bases; an
objective list theory of “well-being” and a capabilities theory. 165
The objective list theory does not define “well-being” as fulfilling individual
preferences but lists what goods are “worth having.” 166 Thus, an objective list
155. Clayton P. Gillette, Kelo and the Local Political Process, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 13, 21 (2005)).)
156. Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 90 (1986)).)
157. Infra Section V.A.
158. Infra Section V.B.
159. Infra Section V.C.
160. Wyman, supra note 49, at 274.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 510-511 (1979); Wyman, supra note 49, at
252–53.
164. Wyman, supra note 49, at 268–69 (Professor Wyman provides three objections to subjective
measures to takings compensation; (1) some individual preferences are objectionable, i.e. racist, (2) preferences
of some people may be more expensive to satisfy than others, and (3) preferences based on circumstances, such
as societal inequalities, will pay poorer people less and wealthier people more).
165. Id. at 275.
166. Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectivity of Well-Being and the Objectives of Property Law, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1701 (2003) (noting that “autonomy and liberty, understanding, accomplishment, deep
and meaningful social relationships and enjoyment” are goods that are deemed worth having).
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theory of “well-being” may measure takings compensation as the amount
necessary to enable former property owners “to enjoy the goods on the list of
desirable things, at the same level that they enjoyed these goods before the
taking.”167 Under a capability theory, compensation for takings is measured by
“the amount required to ensure that former property owners enjoy the same
capabilities that we as a society deem valuable, before and after the taking.” 168
Following the identification of what it means to make a person “whole” by
applying either theories, Professor Wyman presents three ways of calculating
compensation: (1) a single standard payment that all former property owners
receive for the taking of their property, (2) compensation based on schedules
(categorizations) created by legislation or regulation, or (3) case-by-case
determinations (which is the preferred method). 169
Professor Wyman acknowledges that her proposal encounters problems. 170
For example, implementing a case-by-case objective approach to measuring
compensation will increase litigation, as a list of what is considered valuable to
society will likely be too general and necessitate court intervention and
interpretation.171 In addition, her proposal rests on a lofty assumption that society
can agree on a list enumerating what everyone believes is necessary. 172
Although Professor Wyman’s objective approach may adequately
compensate takings for traditional public uses, e.g., parks, freeways, etc., it does
not necessarily work for takings related to private, for-profit business
enterprises.173 Professor Wyman’s proposal relies on either the objective list
theory or the capabilities theory to produce a list detailing what items society
deems should be compensable. 174 Using the land for traditional public purposes
would result in generic items society would deem to be compensable for the
taking, like housing and possibly sentimental value. 175 Since the land is being
used for the public, it wouldn’t necessarily garner strong reactions, given that
everyone in the public can use the land. 176 However, once society learns that the
land will be used for a profit-making enterprise that isn’t necessarily open to the
general public, what constitutes as valuable to society becomes difficult to
pinpoint.177 The side that opposes stadium construction may demand more

167. Wyman, supra note 49, at 275.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 279–80.
170. Id. at 282-83.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 279-80.
173. See id. (explaining that a case-by-case basis will lead to an increase in litigation).
174. Id. at 275.
175. Id. at 275–76 (explaining objective list theory of “well-being” and capability theory).
176. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (describing public outrage after Pfizer
decided to not to build a facility in New London, CT and implementation of stricter state statutes concerning
“public use”).
177. See Wyman, supra note 49, at 279–80. (showing the issues that arise out of her proposal).
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compensation and more things to compensate, while the side that supports
stadium construction will demand less compensation and less items to
compensate. 178 Both sides—who are a part of the same society—must receive
consideration, resulting in a standstill. 179 Ultimately, a general list cannot be
formed under either theory. 180
B. The Special-Purpose Development Corporation (SPDC)
Professors Lehavi and Licht base their proposal on “a corporate finance
perspective.”181 They argue that the two phases of eminent domain–taking and
“just compensation”–should be separated. 182 They characterize a taking as
resembling an incorporation of a firm. 183 Compensation is viewed as “market
driven” and be given through “a special-purpose corporation whose securities
would be offered to condemnees (former property owners whose land was taken
by the use of eminent domain).” 184 Ultimately, Lehavi and Licht believed their
approach limits opportunistic landowners and private developers from taking
advantage of eminent domain. 185
Lehavi and Licht propose that a public authority, typically a municipal
agency employing eminent domain, create a special-purpose development
corporation (SPDC).186 The SPDC may be established as a subsidiary of the
municipality and be delegated powers by the municipality. 187 The municipality
may exercise eminent domain to take private property and then grant certain
rights to the land to the SPDC.188 Property owners, who have had their lands
condemned, are presented two compensation options: (1) “just compensation”
based on pre-project fair market value; or (2) securities in the SPDC “in
proportion to the landowner’s contribution.” 189 The SPDC would have “several–
possibly numerous–shareholders.”190 The SPDC would negotiate with the private
developers who began the project or auction the land off. 191 After selling the
land, the SPDC would distribute the net proceeds from the sale as dividends to
the shareholders.192 The SPDC dissolves when it finishes its duties. 193
178.
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Professors Lehavi and Licht’s proposal doesn’t necessarily change or stray
from fair market value as the standard measure of “just compensation.”194 The
SPDC’s negotiations may fail and lead to property owners receiving only the fair
market value for their property or nothing if the private developers no longer
want the land in question. 195 Additionally, questions of impartiality of the SPDC
remain because local governments provide the SPDC with power. 196
Governmental interest in developing a stadium may push the SPDC to negotiate
quickly and in a manner favorable to the developers. 197 Furthermore, Lehavi and
Licht’s proposal does not compensate for potential post-project fair market
value. 198 Land becomes more valuable if businesses are placed on it. 199 Former
property owners should receive compensation when their land transforms into
something profitable.200 Thus, Lehavi and Licht’s proposal would not necessarily
be beneficial for altering compensation for property owners that lose their land to
stadium construction. 201
C. Self-Assessment Method and Economic Development Theory
Professors Bell and Parchomovsky contend that fully compensating
landowners requires knowledge of the value owners attach to their property. 202
However, relying on the landowner’s testimony about the value they place on
their property is generally not advised because landowners typically exaggerate
their compensation awards.203 Thus, fair market value typically disregards
subjective value, although it is required to fully compensate landowners. 204 To
solve this dilemma, Bell and Parchomovsky advocate a self-reporting systemsimilar to filing taxes-to attach a value to the landowner’s property. 205 Bell and
Parchomovsky admit the problem is over-reporting, rather than underreporting.206
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197. See id. (explaining that their proposal would allow municipalities discretion to empower the SPDC).
198. Id.
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Bell and Parchomovsky’s proposal appear in three phases. 207 The first is
that the government will show its intent to condemn a certain lot or set of lots. 208
Once the government’s declaration has been made, the landowners report the
value she attaches to the property. 209 After the government receives the report, it
can either seize the property or decide not to. 210 Following the government’s
decision, if the government declines to take the property, the government will
impose two restrictions on them. 211 First, the landowner cannot transfer the
property for less than the self-reported value, or a partial inalienability
restraint.212 Second, the landowner’s property tax liability will be based on the
self-reported valuation. 213
The partial inability restraint remains in force for the life of the owner and
can be overcome by paying a redemption fee to the government for transferring
the property beyond the self-reported value. 214 If a landowner wants to transfer
property less than the self-reported value, she can pay the government a fee
“equal to the difference between the sale price and the self-reported value.” 215
Concerning the tax restraint, the property tax assessor must keep track of the
government-assessed value, and the self-reported value. 216 The governmentassessed value will be used for regular property tax bill purposes and the selfreported value will only come into effect when the government decides to
condemn the property.217 Bell and Parchomovsky maintain that the tax
landowners pay will be on the difference between self-reported value and market
value, and further discounted by the ratio between government assessed value
and market value.218 Both of the inalienability and tax restraints must be adjusted
yearly to reflect inflation and fluctuations in the real estate market. 219
Bell and Parchomovsky’s proposal is not without flaws, as objections to their
proposal include abuses by the government and the landowners. 220 Governments
might abuse the self-reporting system by declaring its use of eminent domain on
a piece of property without actually intending to take the land. 221 The
government’s declaration will prompt property owners to report their value on
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the property.222 Most property owners will attach a high valuation for their
property and their property tax liability will reflect this self-reported valuation. 223
Consequently, the government enjoys benefits from increased tax revenue, as
property owners’ property taxes will be based on a higher self-reported land
valuation than it did before the government’s eminent domain proclamation. 224
This empty threat may affect elderly landowners greatly because they are more
motivated to overstate their property’s value as they have no realistic expectation
of a sale while they are living.225 However, Bell and Parchomovsky’s proposal
would guarantee elderly landowners full compensation at their subjective value if
there were a taking, eliminating any motivation to hold out. 226
Furthermore, changed circumstances may hamper their proposal by altering
the subjective value landowners attach to their property. 227 Bell and
Parchomovsky can only assume that landowners will anticipate changed
circumstances when they self-report their property’s value, but that appears to be
unrealistic.228
V. PROPOSAL: SALES AND PROPERTY TAX APPROACH
Despite its inadequacies, fair market value remains the controlling standard
for measuring “just compensation.”229 This Comment’s proposal reinforces and
fills in the deficiencies left by the fair market value standard by fully
compensating property owners and leaving them “subjectively indifferent to
whether [the taking] … took place or not.”230 This Comment argues that when the
government takes privately-owned land using eminent domain to construct
stadiums, the government should pay the former land owners the fair market
value of their property and a share to the profits generated by the stadium. 231
This proposal generates two policy outcomes: first, that fair market value
simply undercompensates property owners and second, changes to “just
compensation” will “have the effect of requiring local officials to pay more for
the land, which should restrict their willingness to make highly speculative uses
of eminent domain.”232
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227. Id.
228. Id. at 903.
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This proposal begins with a process identical to other eminent domain
proceedings; the property owners will be approached by local government
officials and told that their land will be condemned (taken) to build a stadium. 233
The local government will condemn the property and pay the property owners the
fair market value of the property. 234
Subsequently, the government negotiates or informs stadium or sports team
officials that they will be levying a sales and property tax on the stadium. 235
Local governments may implement a local property tax of 2.44%, based on New
Jersey’s property tax rates, and a sales tax of 7.25%, based on California’s basic
statewide sales and use tax.236 The sales tax could be imposed on concession
items and other goods sold at the stadium such as jerseys, memorabilia, hats,
food, drinks, etc.237 The local government can collect this tax and distribute it to
the property owners for a number of years.238 The number of years will equal the
length of time the property owners lived in or possessed the property. 239 If the
property owner passes away, the government’s tax distribution will be given to
the property owner’s spouse or children for the remaining years the property
owner was to be paid. 240 For example, if the property owner passed away after
receiving tax distributions for 15 of the 30 years that he or she owned the
property, his or her spouse or children will receive 15 years of tax
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https://smartasset.com/taxes/california-property-tax-calculator (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
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240. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 6400–14 (West 1991); see also NOLO, Intestate Succession, NOLO (last
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distributions. 241 If the property owner possessed the property but never lived in it,
i.e., land for business, the years he or she receives tax distributions will be
determined by the years he or she owned the land. 242 If the land was in the
property owner’s family’s possession for many generations, the years would be
equivalent to the years the family owned the property up to two generations. 243
This proposal provides former property owners an immediate payout for their
land, and future payments to leave them “subjectively indifferent to whether [the
taking] … took place or not.”244 An issue with this proposal is that a property
owner may receive distributions for an extended period of time, especially if the
land was owned for many generations. 245 Furthermore, this proposal rests on the
assumption that a statute has been passed, or a Supreme Court decision has been
rendered, rejecting fair market value as the sole measure of “just
compensation.”246 State and local governments would only negotiate with
stadium officials if they were compelled by the possibility of lawsuits by
property owners arguing for higher compensation. 247 Accordingly, a statute or
case dismissing fair market value leaves state and local governments with a
decision to make: lose out on the construction of a stadium or pay property
owners more than the fair market value of the property. 248
VI. CONCLUSION
The oral arguments in Kelo v. City of New London indicate that “just
compensation” remains an issue that needs to be explored. 249 Although fair
market value remains the standard for defining “just compensation” it should be
supplemented to avoid under-compensation of property owners. 250 Cities approve
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stadium constructions for altruistic purposes and some stadiums have produced
positive results.251 However, most stadium constructions fall short of their
intended goal of boosting the local economy. 252 Imposing higher compensation
standards will not only avoid under-compensation to property owners, but could
curtail sports teams and government officials from indiscriminately employing
eminent domain.253 The hope is that governments will proceed cautiously when
considering using eminent domain.254
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